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NARROW-TENT DEMOCRATS AND FRINGE OTHERS: THE POLICY VIEWS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE PROFESSORS

by

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Narrow-Tent Democrats and Fringe Others:

The Policy Views of Social Science Professors

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ABSTRACT: This paper provides copious results from a 2003 survey of academics. We analyze the responses of 1208 academics from six scholarly associations (in anthropology, economics, history, legal and political philosophy, political science, and sociology) with regard to their views on 18 policy issues. The issues include economic regulations, personal-choice restrictions, and military action abroad. We find that the academics overwhelmingly vote Democratic and that the Democratic dominance has increased significantly since 1970. A multivariate analysis shows strongly that Republican scholars are more likely to land outside of academia. On the 18 policy questions, the Democratic-voter responses have much less variation than do the Republicans. The left has a narrow tent. The Democratic and Republican policy views of academics are somewhat in line with the ideal types, except that across the board both groups are simply more statist than the ideal types might suggest. Regarding disciplinary consensus, we find that the discipline with least consensus is economics. We do a cluster analysis, and the mathematical technique sorts the respondents into groups that nicely correspond to familiar ideological categories: establishment left, progressive, conservative, and libertarian. The conservative group and the libertarian group are equal in size (35 individuals, each), suggesting that academics who depart from the leftist ranks are as likely to be libertarian as conservative. We also find that conservatives are closer to the establishment left than they are to the libertarians.

Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Leavey School of Business and the Robert Finocchio Fund at Santa Clara University for assistance in meeting the costs of the survey, and especially to Ms. Donna Perry, Assistant Dean, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, for acting as independent controller and certifying the results. Also, we would like to thank Niclas Berggren for comments.

Americans are asking themselves why they pay so much money to professors whose work is often purely "academic" and whose political ideas typically are left-wing. This paper presents results from a large survey of academics. We look at the data from many different angles, using detailed figures, cross-tabulations, multivariate analysis, and cluster analysis. The chief goal of this paper is to see what the data say about the ideological composition of academia.

Not addressed in this paper is the big question: Why are academics so left-wing, and so uniformly so?

We find that to best analyze the ideological character of cultural institutions we necessarily take sides. The numbers are what they are, but we have developed the numbers in a research process and present them here in particular ways. The reader will want to know where ideologically we are coming from. Thus, we think it useful to say upfront that our sensibilities are classical liberal/libertarian.

U.S. Professors under the Microscope

In their 1975 work *The Divided Academy*, Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset wrote that the empirical record has sustained Richard Hofstadter's generalization that from the late nineteenth century "the political weight of American intellectuals, including leading academics, has been disproportionately on the progressive, liberal, and leftist side" (p. 14). Survey evidence as early as 1937 showed

that social science professors were disproportionately Democratic (Ladd and Lipset 1975, 27f; on Canadian professors using 1987 data see Nakhaie and Brym 1999).

But the professors went contrary to what Charles B. Spaulding and Henry A. Turner (1968) called "a well established empirical finding," namely that "persons occupying the favored positions in American society tend on the whole to be Republicans and to exhibit conservative political attitudes" (p. 247). It was conjectured that social-science professors exhibited critical thinking and an interest in social criticism, and hence were "liberal" and Democratic. From 1959 to 1964, Spaulding and Turner conducted surveys of scholarly associations. They found that philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and psychologists were on the whole about 3-to-1 Democrat to Republican, while botanists, geologists, mathematicians, and engineers were much more likely to be Republican (Spaulding and Turner 1968, 253). The findings were "consistent with the idea that an important element in explaining the difference is the degree to which the perspectives of the members of each profession tend to be oriented toward social criticism or [like the botanists etc.] the application of knowledge in the business world" (p. 247). The early sociology literature projected the idea that elites were tied into the status-quo and hence were conservative, while college professors and others posed a challenge to the system. Sometimes the literature (e.g., Gouldner 1970) accused the professoriate, especially the academic elites, of being too tied into the system and too conservative.

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in 1969 and 1975 and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1984 conducted national surveys of U. S. professors (Carnegie Council 1978; Carnegie Foundation 1989). A

major figure in bringing the survey data and other evidence to bear on previous conjectures was Seymour Martin Lipset, who, with E.C. Ladd, strove to integrate interpretation and evidence (Lipset and Ladd 1972; Ladd and Lipset 1975). Lipset and his collaborators challenged hypotheses floated by sociologists, and found that most academics are "liberal" or left, and the more eminent members especially so (Lipset and Ladd 1972; Lipset 1982). Lipset's take on the subject was somewhat blurry. In his early years he comes across as an earnest leftist sociologist interested in getting a better empirical handle on the matter, but in later years he despairs over the state of sociology (Lipset 1994), and his work sustains complaints about academia being too leftwing.[1]

In economics, surveying the tribe emerged later, but when it did, it was much more attentive to specific policy questions and it had a different emphasis. Kearl et al (1979) initiated the tradition. Their study asked public-policy questions, and many of their questions were reproduced by subsequent studies seeking to track trends in opinion (see for instance Alston et al 1992, Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2003, Blendon et al 1997; Caplan 2001, 2002; Fuchs 1996; Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba 1998; Whaples 1995; 1996; Moorhouse, Morriss, and Whaples 1999; on graduate students see Colander 2005). There have also been surveys of economists in other countries, with many similar questions (Frey et al 1984; Block and Walker 1988; Ricketts and Shoesmith 1990; 1992; Anderson and Blandy 1992; Anderson et al 1993). One of the main themes in the economics tradition has been to ascertain whether the discipline displays "consensus," a hallmark of science. The surveys have generally shown little concern for party support or ideological self-description.

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[1] For criticism of Ladd and Lipset, see Hamilton and Hargens (1993). In our opinion, much of the controversy (and opacity) stems from problems with "liberal vs. conservative."

In fields other than sociology and economics, there seem to be little tradition of self-investigation. But scholars are now being placed under the microscope, for example in political science by Heckelman and Whaples (2003) and psychology by Ray (1989) and Redding (2001).

Stanley Rothman, Robert Lichter and Neil Nevitte (2005) continue in the Carnegie/Lipset tradition, and show that the ideological homogeneity in academia has intensified in the past few decades. Other surveys that reinforce these conclusions include work by the Brookings Institution (2001) and the Higher Education Research Institute at University of California, Los Angeles (Lindholm et al 2003). The results are further bolstered by voter registration investigations, such as Zinsmeister (2002), Horowitz and Lehrer (2002), Klein and Western (2005), and Cardiff and Klein (2006). The politics of academia is now a major topic in public discourse and increasingly among intellectuals themselves; for example, a recent issue of this journal contained the proceedings of a conference at Boston University on the state of the social sciences, with a session specifically on the political leanings of the social sciences (*Critical Review* 2005: 187-208).

Here we draw on a 2003 survey designed by Daniel Klein, but handled and certified by an independent controller. We (Klein and Charlotta Stern) have published several papers that make narrower use of the survey data.[2]

[2] 2005a focus on the Democrat-to-Republican ratio throughout the social sciences and humanities, 2004 focus on the policy views of anthropologists and sociologists, 2005b and 2005c focus on the policy views of economists; 2005d focuses on the policy views of political scientists; 2006 draws on the survey results for sociologists in calling for a place for classical liberalism in sociology.

There is one way in which our investigation is quite unique. Most surveys that ask about ideology employ the conventional "liberal v. conservative" formulation. We feel that that formulation is confining and often either insubstantive or misleading. In our survey, we used a format that lends itself to a "statist v. libertarian" formulation. This formulation is more substantive and more flexible, in that the raw material it generates can be used to construct and identify familiar ideological categories, as the cluster analysis here shows.

Description of Data

The data comes from a survey taken in the Spring of 2003. It was designed so as to achieve the following goals: (1) to elicit an overall judgment of support or opposition on 18 types of government activism; (2) to make the format uniform so that an individual's set of responses could be combined into an index; and (3) to illuminate ideological divisions within disciplines, especially by voting behavior.[3]

We surveyed members of six nationwide scholarly associations:

American Anthropological Association
American Economics Association
American Historical Association
American Political Science Association
American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy[4]
American Sociological Association

[3] In all three respects, sections of both of the two specialized surveys (one of labor economists, one of public economists) in Fuchs et al. 1998 are very much like our survey in design and spirit (see pp. 1416, 1420).

[4] The American Philosophical Association declined to sell us an address lists, based on a general policy of not giving out addresses except for matters of special interest to philosophers. We surveyed all 486 members of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. Their membership base is smaller and more specialized and we have chosen to exclude them in some of the analyses that follows.

The associations supplied randomly generated lists, and in five of the six cases the survey was mailed to 1000 members, and to 486 members in the odd case, making a total of 5,486 surveys mailed out. Of those, 1678 (nonblank) surveys were returned, a response rate of 30.9 percent (correcting for P.O returns etc.).[5] As shown in Table 1, the individual association response rates varied from 22.6 to 35.2 percent.

Table 1: Response rate by association surveyed

	Surveys returned non-blank	Response rate (%)
Anthropology	349	34.9
Economics	264	26.6
History	297	30.9
Philosophy (pol./legal)	108	22.6
Political Science	309	31.0
Sociology	351	36.2
Total	**1678**	**30.9**

If our survey results are misleading, it could be for two reasons:

Response bias. It could be that, for example, Democrat members are more likely to complete and return the survey than Republican and other members. No available evidence speaks to this possibility.[6] We are inclined to doubt that any such bias is significant.

Membership bias. There could be a bias in the membership of the associations. For example, maybe Democratic anthropologists are more likely to be members of the American Anthropological Association than Republican anthropologists. When we embarked on this investigation in 2003 we figured such bias would be insignificant, as five of the six associations are the major nationwide association

[5] At the survey home page one can view the survey instrument and documents explaining the methods, independent control, and certification of the survey results. The survey homepage URL is http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/survey.htm.

[6] For what it's worth, the Fuller et al 1995 survey of delegates at the 1992 national conventions received 21 response rate from Democrats and 26 percent from Republicans.

of the discipline. But the more we have learned about the associations the more we suspect that there is a Democrat/left tilt in the membership, although we doubt that it is very large (on the American Economic Association, see McEachern 2006; Klein 2006). We anticipate having a better handle on this question in the near future.

At present, we suspect that there is some membership bias, but that it is only small to moderate. One reason to doubt that the biases are large is that our findings here for the Democrat-to-Republican ratios generally agree with other D to R estimates, notably the voter registration studies (which depend neither on response nor association membership) and the survey reported by Rothman et al (2005). Note that even if it were the case that the associations do have a moderate social-democratic tilt, it would not much affect the general importance of the results. The major nationwide associations are the leading organizational and publishing institutions of the discipline, and members generally have more influence than non-members. Put differently, the more clout that someone of an ideology has, the more likely it is that she is a member of the major association.

Academics' Voting Patterns

The present article is concerned with respondents with academic careers. One survey question asked:

Pleased check your primary employment (if retired, kindly answer retrospectively):

☐	☐	☐	☐	_____
academic	public sector	private sector	independent research	other

The percentages reporting[7] academic were anthropology 73.1 percent, economics 48.5 percent, history 71.4 percent, philosophy 76.6 percent, political science 86.4 percent, and sociology 74.9 percent. In this paper we focus on those respondents who reported being or having been primarily employed in academia, 1208 individuals constituting 72 percent of the sample.

A question asked the respondent to check highest degree held, and the frequency of responses for those in academics is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Frequency of highest degree for academic sample

Highest degree	Frequency	% of this sample
Ph.D.	1151	95.28
Masters	47	3.89
Bachelor's	4	0.33
J.D.	3	0.25
Other	3	0.25

The voting question was as follows:

[7] 42 respondents marked either public sector, private sector, or independent research, but we included them as academic based on their comments and answers to the two immediately ensuing questions, which are predicated on academic employment.

To which political party have the candidates you've voted for in the past ten years mostly belonged?

☐	☐	☐	☐	_____
Democratic	Green	Libertarian	Republican	other

Among the 1208 academic respondents reported voting as follows: 962 (79.6 %) Democratic (D), 112 (9.3 %) Republican (R), 17 (1.4 %) Green, 13 (1.1 %) Libertarian, 29 (2.4 %) checked two or more responses, 16 (1.3 %) wrote in another party, 17 (1.4 %) said they cannot or do not vote, and 42 (3.5 %) did not respond to the question.

The D-to-R ratios of the six groups are shown in Figure 1.[8] We combine anthropology and sociology because in those groups the number of Republicans was very low and because the response patterns to the policy questions were very similar (see Klein and Stern

[8] These ratios differ from those determined by Klein and Stern 2004c, which includes academic respondents only up to the age of 70.

2005b).

Figure 1: D to R Ratios of the Six Academic Associations



Using these results and other evidence, Klein and Stern (2005c) arrive at the estimate that the D-to-R ratio for the active[9] social-science and humanities faculty nationwide is probably at least 8 to 1.[10] That estimate lines up with voter-registration

[9] By "active" we mean those up through age 70 at the time of the survey.

[10] When we made those estimates we were less concerned about membership bias. That concern has increased somewhat in our mind, and ratcheting the "at least" estimate down to 7 to 1 is not a bad idea. Still,we recommend the 8 to 1 estimate, as it was from the start a rather "conservative" estimate in its 10 to 1 assumption about the entire not-economics social-science/humanities faculty.

results and is further bolstered by Rothman et al (2005, 6). Drawing on the survey data provided in Ladd and Lipset (1975), Table 3 shows that the ratio has changed since 1970. The 1964 election (Johnson v. Goldwater) had a distribution like that in 2003, but the composite for '64/'68/'72 indicates that since that era the ratio has doubled.

Table 3: Then and Now: Democrat per Republican over time

	1964 Presidential Election	1968 Presidential Election	1972 Presidential Election	Composite '64/'68/'72	Klein-Stern 2003
Social Science	8.9:1	3.8:1	3.5:1	4:1	8:1
Humanities	6.6:1	3.1:1	2.4:1		

Source: Ladd and Lipset 1975, 62-64

On the whole, compared to younger professors, older professors are somewhat more often Republican. Figure 2 shows by generations the D and R proportions for each discipline (limited to the either-D-or-R sample). We see that the D percentages are generally trending up and the R percentages are generally trending down. In particular, there is no evidence that the youngest generation breaks the trend (only the economics mailing list contained very young members).



Figure 2: Democratic and Republican voting, by age groups, by discipline.

Policy Views, Ds and Rs

Figure 3 consists of 18 small panels. Each panel shows the exact wording of the policy question, the response distribution for D voters and R voters, and the mean values. We suggest that our sample probably pretty well represents overall social-science/humanities faculty, because, although the economists had a relatively low response rate (26.6 %) and a low academic rate (48.5 %), they are here part of a sample that does *not* include many, many of the social-science/humanities disciplines, and we are quite sure that those disciplines are rather like the non-economists in the sample. That is, in the social sciences/humanities generally, there is only one economics, and it is in the

sample, so even though economics is whittled down by the response rate and the academic variable, that probably would tend to compensate for the narrowness of the set of disciplines sampled.

Figure 3: Policy-Issue Response Distributions of Academic Ds (solid) and Rs (striped)

support strongly	support mildly	have mixed feelings	oppose mildly	oppose strongly
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

Tariffs on imported goods to protect American Industries and jobs:



Minimum wage laws:



Workplace safety regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA):



Pharmaceutical market regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA):



Air-quality and water-quality regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):



Laws making it illegal for private parties to discriminate (on the basis of race, gender, age, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation) against other private parties, in employment or accommodations:



Laws restricting the use and exchange of "hard" drugs such as cocaine and heroin:



Laws restricting prostitution:



Laws restricting gambling:



Laws restricting gun ownership:



Government ownership of industrial enterprises:



Redistribution policies (transfer and aid programs and tax progressivity):



Government production of schooling (k through 12):



Using monetary policy to tune the economy:



Using fiscal policy to tune the economy:



Tighter rather than looser controls on immigration:



American military aid or presence abroad to promote democracy and the rule of law:



Foreign aid and assistance by such organizations as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and US Aid:



The 18 panels of Figure 3 are a good opportunity to make some basic points about the data.

A. Do the Ds and Rs Conform to Ideal Types?

The ideal-typical Democrat is suspicious of private business and market forces ("capitalism"). She tends to be permissive on "deviant" life-styles and choices (Ladd and Lipset 1975, 39; Redding 2001, 205). She is likely to support government policies to protect the poor and the excluded, and to believe in government regulation as a means to correct social problems such as racism or school segregation. The Democrat tends to be pacifist and more critical of American military interventions abroad. The ideal-typical Republican is friendly to private business and market forces. He tends to be restrictive on "depraved" life-styles and choices. He is suspicious toward government, and believes in self-reliance rather than government protection. He is a patriot and believes that the government should protect the American people from external threats. Thus, the Republican is more favorable to military action and immigration restrictions.

Do the results in the 18 panels generally support the ideal types? In terms of the differences between Democrats and Republicans, the results line up with the ideal types. But both groups of academics are more quite statist even where they are supposed to be somewhat libertarian. Though less enthusiastic than Democrats, Republicans are not opponents of economic regulation and redistribution. And, though (only slightly) less paternalistic than Republicans, Democrats are not opponents of restrictions on hard drugs, prostitution, and gambling, nor are they preponderantly strong opponents of military action abroad.

B. The Democratic Tent Is Narrow

The social-sciences/humanities faculty is pretty much a one-party system. But if the Democratic tent were a broad tent, then a one-party system may have intellectual diversity. The 18 panels show, however, that the Democrats have almost no diversity of opinion on minimum wage, occupational safety, FDA regulation, the EPA, discrimination, gun control, redistribution, and schooling. On an issue-by-issue basis, the Democrats show much less diversity than the Republicans. Table 4 shows the sum of the 18 policy-response standard deviations:

Table 4: The Democratic tent is narrower

	Σ 18 policy-response standard deviations
Democrats	17.1
Republicans	23.1

The point can be shown another way. For each respondent we can compute an overall score on the 18 policy issues: the strong statist would have a score of 1, and the strong libertarian would have a score close to 5.[11] Figure 4 shows the Republicans' distribution by discipline by 0.5 intervals. (The figure and ensuing presentations omit the data from the survey of the American Society for Political Legal Philosophy, because doing so reduces clutter and because the ASPLP sample is small, had a low response rate, and does not clearly correspond to a particular department on campus. Including the data would not change the character of the results.)

Figure 4:



[11] We say "close to" (rather than "equal to") because some of the policy issues admit of disagreement over what the more or less statist (or libertarian) answer would be. Notably, some would say that toppling an exceptionally oppressive government abroad, despite being activist on the part of the U.S. government, is not anti-libertarian, because it reduces government coercion on net. Reasonable disagreement over what is more or less libertarian would also be found for the questions on monetary policy and perhaps immigration (because of how immigrants supposedly alter the political culture and hence future policy).

We see in Figure 4 that the preponderance of Republicans are in the 1.5 to 3.0 range, but that there are some scattered further to the right, particular among economists. Figure 5 shows the same for the Democrats. They are much more tightly packed. Almost none had scores above 3.0, and, in fact, not one above 3.5. Not only do the Democrats utterly dominate the social sciences and humanities, but they have a narrow tent of belief. Clearly, campus diversity does not extend to political/policy ideas and values.

Figure 5:



C. Statism v. Libertarianism

The 18 panels show that the vast majority of academics are quite statist. On 12 of the 18 policy issues, the average D response and the average R response are both 3.00 or

lower. The Ds overall indicate strong support on 8 of the 18 public policies: minimum wage laws, the OSHA, the FDA, the EPA, discrimination laws, gun ownership laws, redistribution, and government schools. Their highest mean response is on the immigration question, at 3.59, which is not very high. Overall, the Democrats are supporters of status-quo interventions. The Republicans have high mean responses on tariffs and on government ownership of industrial enterprises, but they are significantly more statist than the Democrats on immigration and military presence. Most of the Republican mean responses are centrist. Table 5 shows the 18-issue policy scores for the four groups of voters.

Table 5: Both the Democrats and the Republicans are quite statist

	N	18-issue policy score, overall
Dem. voters	962	2.12
Rep. voters	112	2.69
Green voters	17	2.30
Libert. voters	13	4.24

Another way to show the scantiness of libertarian opinion in academia is to put all the academic respondents (not just the Ds and Rs, and again excluding the ASPLP group) on the policy-score axis, by discipline, as in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Most academics are highly statist.



Figure 6 shows that, in all the fields except economics, most respondents lay in the interval 1.5 to 2.5, indicating that the majority of social scientists support government activism on the 18 issues.[12]

Republicans Scholars Are More Likely to Land Outside Academia

Again, we asked whether the respondent's primary employment has been academic or various non-academic options. As shown in Tables 6, non-academic

[12] Fuller et al (1995) provide survey data comparing American Economics Association members with Republican delegates and Democratic delegates at the 1992 national conventions. The survey contains many policy questions, though not immigration or military action. The Republican delegates appear to be significantly more libertarian than economists, while the Democratic delegates do not appear to be noticeably more libertarian or more statist than the economists.

scholars are more likely to vote Republican than academic scholars. The same information is used in Table 7 to compute association members' chances of landing outside of academia. We see that across the board, Republicans are more likely to land outside of academia. The results agree with the finding by Rothman et al (2005) that conservative scholars have less prestigious positions, controlling for research accomplishment.

Table 6: D-to-R ratios by whether one is employed in academia vs. outside academia

	Anth-Soc		Economics		History		Philosophy		Pol. Sci.		ALL	
	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not
Dem	443	139	78	75	169	61	64	18	208	29	962	322
Repub	21	16	27	34	20	18	7	4	37	6	112	78
D : R	21	8.7**	2.9	2.2	8.5	3.4**	9.1	4.5	5.6	5	8.6	4.1**

** A chi-square test yields 0.01 significance between Academic and Not, within the discipline (differences in other disciplines are not significant at 0.10).

Table 7: Chance of Landing Outside of Academia

	Anth-Soc	*Economics*	*History*	*Philosophy*	*Political Science*	*ALL*
Dem	0.239	0.490	0.268	0.220	0.126	0.25
Repub	0.432	0.557	0.474	0.364	0.140	0.41

We investigated whether the data evinces a tendency for individuals with higher (more libertarian) policy scores to land outside of academia. When we examined low scores (1.0-2.5) versus high scores (3.5-5.0), we found that the highs were disproportionately landing outside of academia in anth-soc (significant at 0.01) and history (significant at 0.05). We also looked at mean scores in the various categories. Overall, we did not find strong evidence for the claim, partly because scholars working in non-academic government jobs tended to have somewhat lower scores. As we further breakdown the within-discipline data into private sector, independent research, etc. we get few respondents in each cell making it hard to address whether higher-score

individuals tend to get sorted out. One may conjecture that the relative-likelihood of membership is higher for an anti-left scholar in academia than for such scholar outside academia, because such a scholar joins mainly for professional reasons, which could mean that our data fail to evince a sorting-out that nonetheless exists.

Younger Professors Are Slightly Less Statist

The six panels of Figure 7 show the scatter of points for all academic respondents (not just the Ds and Rs) with horizontal birth-year and vertical individual's score on the 18 issues. Every trend line is rising slightly. That is, younger professors tend to be slightly less statist than older professors.[13] Similar scatter-plots (not presented here) show that Democrats in all six associations are trending upward in policy index, and Republicans in four of the six. That is, almost across the board, the younger academics tend to be slightly less statist than their aged counterparts.

[13] Regressions using birthyear to predict policy scores turn out to be statistically significant in history (0.01 percent level), in sociology (0.03) and in anthropology (0.10).

Figure 7: Younger professors tend to be slightly less statist



If we assume that there is no tendency for the individual professor's policy views to move in either direction (statist or libertarian), then these data suggest that academia, despite being more Democratic, is slightly *less* statist than in, say, 1970. The six policy issues with largest correlation coefficient between birthyear and policy position (looking at all academics as one big group) are fiscal policy (0.25), immigration (0.22), FDA (0.16), foreign aid (0.13), minimum wage (0.12), drugs (0.11). A negative coefficient is found for only two issues, redistribution and government schooling, but the coefficient sizes are tiny (-0.04 and –0.01, respectively).

Although the birthyear trend line is slightly upward, we cannot be sure that academia is becoming correspondingly more libertarian. It is quite possible that the *longitudinal* tendency is not flat—that is, that *the individual* tends to migrate one way or

the other over time. One theory is that ideological migrants tend to go in the libertarian direction, because collectivistic instincts and sentiments get "mugged by reality" and illusions about government and the political process tend to disintegrate. A countervailing theory is that after years of immersion in the academy, the professor tends to move in the statist direction.[14] All we know for sure is that, today, younger professors tend to be slightly less statist than older professors.

Cross-tabulation of policy scores

In the tables below, we tabulate policy scores by discipline and political party. The 18 policy issues are separated into five sub-groups: economic interventions, government protection of the disadvantaged, gun control, cross-national government activism, and personal choice controls. The disciplines are ordered by their D-to-R ratios.

[14] The survey asked the respondent what she thought on each issue when she was 25 years old. The retrospective question is one we will be addressing when we get around to analyzing the when-25 data from our survey.

Table 8: Academic Democrats' and Republicans' Views on Economic Interventions.
Means (St.D)

	Anth-Soc		*History*		*Pol. Sci*		*Economics*	
Issue addressed	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
Minimum wage laws	1.12	2.33[a]	1.11	2.30[a]	1.26[b]	2.65[a]	2.35[b]	4.37[ac]
	(0.46)	(1.35)	(0.45)	(1.34)	(0.61)	(1.35)	(1.30)	(0.19)
Occupational safety regs	1.11	1.62[a]	1.09	1.95[a]	1.15	2.31[a]	1.58[b]	2.85[ac]
(OSHA)	(0.41)	(0.86)	(0.31)	(1.05)	(0.47)	(1.11)	(0.83)	(1.06)
Pharmaceutical market	1.29	1.71	1.16	1.65[a]	1.20	1.91[a]	1.63[b]	2.89[ac]
regulation (FDA)	(0.65)	(0.90)	(0.47)	(0.93)	(0.55)	(1.24)	(0.93)	(1.40)
Air and water regulation	1.05	1.62[a]	1.04	1.80[a]	1.13	2.11[a]	1.40[b]	2.81[ac]
(EPA)	(0.28)	(0.86)	(0.19)	(0.83)	(0.43)	(1.05)	(0.78)	(1.18)
Government ownership of	3.06	4.47[a]	3.03	4.40[a]	3.33[b]	4.68[a]	4.03[b]	4.67[a]
industrial enterprise	(1.18)	(0.84)	(1.20)	(0.94)	(1.28)	(0.71)	(1.16)	(0.78)
Tuning the economy by fiscal	2.08	2.05	1.87[b]	2.30	1.69[b]	2.16[a]	2.42[b]	3.69[ac]
policy	(0.91)	(0.76)	(0.86)	(1.08)	(0.87)	(1.07)	(1.22)	(1.52)
Mean of the means	1.62	2.30	1.55	2.4	1.63	2.64	2.24	3.55
∑ (St.D)	3.89	5.57	3.48	6.17	4.21	6.53	6.22	6.13
Difference: ∑(D – R)	-4.09		-5.11		-6.06		-7.87	

The within-discipline t-tests show that many of the differences between Ds and Rs are significant at the one-percent level (see note a). The within-party, between-discipline tests use anth-soc as the reference group (see notes b and c). For instance, Ds in political science are more supportive of FDA regulation than Ds in anth-soc. In nearly every case, academic economists of both parties are less supportive of economic intervention than their counterparts in the other disciplines. This does not translate into an economists'

[a] T-test (unequal st. d.) of within-discipline difference between mean D and mean R responses, significant at the 0.01 level.
[b] 0.01 level significant difference by discipline in a within-Democrats regression, with dummy indicators for discipline, using anth-soc as the reference group.
[c] 0.01 level significant difference by discipline in a within-Republicans regression, with dummy indicators for discipline, using anth-soc as the reference group.

consensus, however. Adding up the differences between the Ds and Rs (the last row of Table 8) suggest that the difference between the two parties is largest in economics. Comparing the standard deviations of the Ds (the larger of the two groups) indicate that on most economic policy issues, the Ds in economics show more variation than those in the other disciplines.

Table 9 treats the role of government as a protector of the disadvantaged.

Table 9Academic Democrats' and Republicans' Views on Government (Purportedly) Protecting the Disadvantaged. *Means (St.D)*

	Anth-Soc		*History*		*Pol. Sci*		*Economics*	
Issue addressed	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
Government production of schooling (k - 12)	1.48 (0.95)	2.94 [a] (1.39)	1.56 (1.03)	3.11 [a] (1.49)	1.29 (0.73)	2.48 [a] (1.28)	1.54 (0.96)	3.27 [a] (1.46)
Discrimination Controls	1.17 (0.58)	1.71[a] (0.90)	1.21 (0.69)	2.50[ac] (1.43)	1.18 (0.56)	2.14[a] (1.35)	1.33 (0.78)	2.70[ac] (1.46)
Redistribution	1.32 (0.68)	3.33 [a] (0.91)	1.35 (0.76)	3.60 [a] (1.43)	1.23 (0.55)	3.08 [a] (1.36)	1.47 (0.75)	3.30 [a] (1.27)
Foreign aid (World Bk, IMF, USAID)	2.22 (1.24)	2.00 (1.17)	1.99 (1.24)	2.20 (1.20)	1.75 [b] (1.02)	2.33 [a] (1.26)	1.79 [b] (1.04)	2.93 [ac] (1.21)
Mean of the means	1.55	2.50	1.53	2.86	1.36	2.51	1.53	3.05
∑ (St.D)	3.45	4.37	3.72	5.55	2.86	5.25	3.53	5.4
Difference: ∑(D – R)	-3.79		-5.30		-4.58		-6.06	

[a b c] Explained at the foot of Table 8.

On three of the four issues, there are significant differences between the Ds and Rs in all the surveyed disciplines (indicated by footnote a). When it comes to differences between the disciplines, the Ds in political science and economics are more supportive of foreign aid than those in anth-soc. The Rs in history and economics are less supportive of discrimination controls than are the Rs in anth-soc.

Table 10: Academic Democrats' and Republicans' Views on Gun Control
Means (St.D)

Issue addressed	*Anth-Soc* D	*Anth-Soc* R	*History* D	*History* R	*Pol. Sci* D	*Pol. Sci* R	*Economics* D	*Economics* R
Gun control	1.34	3.24 [a]	1.12[b]	2.50[a]	1.29	2.86[a]	1.45	3.70[a]
	(0.82)	(1.61)	(0.42)	(1.32)	(0.78)	(1.48)	(0.85)	(1.56)
Difference: ∑(D – R)	-1.90		-1.38		-1.57		-2.25	

[a b c] Explained at the foot of Table 8.

The Ds overall are supportive of gun control. The Ds in history are more supportive than Ds in anth-soc.

Table 11:Academic Democrats' and Republicans' Views on Cross-national Government Activism.*Means (St.D)*

Issue addressed	*Anth-Soc* D	*Anth-Soc* R	*History* D	*History* R	*Pol. Sci* D	*Pol. Sci* R	*Economics* D	*Economics* R
Tariffs to protect industries	3.31	3.65	3.46	2.75[ac]	3.69[b]	3.94	4.47[b]	4.81[ac]
and jobs	(1.12)	(1.39)	(1.19)	(1.21)	(1.16)	(1.23)	(0.99)	(0.48)
Tighter controls on	3.70	1.81 [a]	3.56	1.90 [a]	3.29 [b]	1.86 [a]	3.68	3.26[c]
immigration	(1.31)	(1.08)	(1.32)	(1.12)	(1.35)	(1.06)	(1.17)	(1.43)
Military aid/presence abroad	3.81	1.95 [a]	3.54	2.05 [a]	3.00 [b]	2.16 [a]	3.17 [b]	2.19 [a]
	(1.29)	(0.97)	(1.24)	(1.05)	(1.32)	(1.19)	(1.28)	(1.04)
Mean of the means	3.61		3.52		3.33		3.77	
		2.47		2.23		2.66		3.42
	3.72		3.75		3.83		3.44	
∑ (St.D)								
		3.44		3.38		3.48		2.95
Difference: ∑(D – R)	3.41		3.86		2.02		1.07	

[a b c] Explained at the foot of Table 8.

In Table 11, we see that the Rs are more supportive of immigration controls and military action abroad. Note that the survey was conducted during the onset of the United States government's invasion of Iraq, and it is possible that political loyalties and animosities were intensified with respect to the military question.

While the Rs in economics are the most strongly opposed to protective tariffs, those in History are the group most favorable to protection. It seems that there are a few nativistic Republican historians out there (note also their immigration score).

Table 12:Academic Democrats' and Republicans' Views on Personal Choice Controls.*Means (St.D)*

	Anth-Soc		*History*		*Pol. Sci*		*Economics*	
Issue addressed	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
Controls on "hard" drugs	2.52	2.09	2.10[b]	1.35[a]	2.18[b]	1.64[a]	2.28	2.70
	(1.33)	(1.37)	(1.17)	(0.81)	(1.31)	(1.05)	(1.36)	(1.51)
Prostitution controls	3.24	2.45[a]	2.99	2.40	3.00	2.58	3.06	3.30
	(1.20)	(1.28)	(1.17)	(1.19)	(1.22)	(1.34)	(1.30)	(1.59)
Gambling restrictions	2.82	2.63	2.46[b]	1.90[a]	2.76	2.69	3.09	3.22
	(1.23)	(1.34)	(1.21)	(0.97)	(1.29)	(1.43)	(1.36)	(1.65)
Mean of the means	2.86	2.39	2.52	1.88	2.65	2.30	2.81	3.07
∑ (St.D)	3.76	3.99	3.55	2.97	3.82	3.82	4.02	4.75
Difference: ∑(D – R)	1.41		1.90		1.03		-0.79	

[a b c] Explained at the foot of Table 8.

When it comes to the public policies regulating personal choices, the Ds seem to be more permissive overall, but the differences are often not significant at the 0.01 level. Historian and political science Ds are less supportive of drug prohibition than the Rs. Among the anth-socs, the Ds are less favorable to prostitution controls than are the Rs, and historian Ds are less likely to support restrictions on gambling than are the Rs. Across the disciplines, the Ds in history and political science are more supportive of drug prohibition than the Ds in anth-soc. Many items in the tables tell us that economics Republicans are more libertarian than the other Republicans. In fact, on sex, drugs, and gaming, econ Rs are more libertarian than econ Ds, contradicting one of the ideal typical differences between Rs and Ds..

Remarks about Economics. Table 13 provides the means and standard deviations on all 18 policy issues. Economics stands out in several ways.

Table 13:Academics' Mean 18-issue Score by D v. R and by Discipline[a]

	Anth-Soc			History			Political Science			Economics		
	D	R	All	D	R	All	D	R	All	D	R	All
Mean (St.D.) [N]	2.15 (0.34) [443]	2.39 (0.43) [21]	**2.18** (0.40) [519]	2.04 (0.32) [169]	2.38 (0.67) [20]	**2.09** (0.41) [212]	2.02 (0.33) [208]	2.53 (0.58) [37]	**2.14** (0.49) [267]	2.36 (0.46) [78]	3.29 (0.71) [27]	**2.65** (0.73) [128]

[a] For the academic philosophy respondents (ASPLP), the means, st.d.s and Ns are as follows: D: 2.15 (0.46) 64; R: 2.94 (1.15) 7; All: 2.33 (0.71) 82.

1. Economics' mean score of 2.65 is significantly higher than the others. However, it is generally statist. Rumors of economists generally being free-market supporters are unfounded. By the metrics of the survey, economists on the whole are much closer to the rest of social-science professors than to moderate libertarians (the 13 Libertarian-voting academics in the sample had a mean score of 4.24). Economists' average score exceeds 4.0 on only two issues: tariffs and government ownership of industry.
2. Economics is sometimes said to be the most scientific of the social sciences. Many have alleged that one of the hallmarks of science is consensus. One would think that the most scientific discipline would exhibit the most consensus. We find, however, the economics demonstrates the least consensus. In economics, the 18-issue-score standard deviations are largest within each party and overall.[15]

[15] The tables here do not show the individual-issue st.d.s for the entire group. The sum of the 18 st.d.s is highest for economics at 22.90, and lowest for anth-soc at 17.84.

Indeed, of the five scholarly groups,[16] economists exhibit the least consensus on 13 of the 18 issues: minimum wage, OSHA, FDA, EPA, discrimination, drugs, prostitution, gambling, guns, redistribution, government schooling, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. It is frequently on their own scientific turf that economists' collective judgment least satisfies the supposed hallmark of science. Our own (libertarian) interpretation of the finding is one that is favorable to economics, relative to the other disciplines: Better to have a lack of consensus than a misguided consensus.

3. However, on four issues where Democrats have a relatively high score, especially tariffs and government ownership of industry, but also immigration and military, the economists have the *most* consensus. A crude way of reading the consensus (st.d.) results is that economic thinking goes with higher policy scores, and when general academic (i.e., Democratic) opinion is very statist, that spells less consensus, but when general academic opinion is moderate, that spells more consensus. (The only issue on which economists have neither the highest nor the lowest st.d. is foreign aid.)

Statistical Investigation of Voting

Here we report multivariate regressions to determine statistical correlations with voting D (and D-and/or-Green). The analysis includes the data from the philosophy group (the ASPLP). The analysis drops respondents with missing data for one or more of

[16] That is, continuing to treat anth-soc as one group, and including also the philosophers as a separate group.

the variables (however, the policy-index variable is computed and intact so long as the respondent answered at least one of the 18 policy questions). The first two statistical models make the dependent variable voting D as opposed to voting R; that is, Models 1 and 2 are confined to respondents who vote either D or R. Model 3 makes the dependent variable voting D-and/or-Green[17] ("left"), as opposed to voting R-and/or-Libertarian ("right"), and hence is confined to that slightly enlarged set of respondents. The Ns for each model are reported in Table 14.

We use several independent variables. To check whether voting D corresponds with generally being statist on the issues, we include the 18-issue policy index as an independent variable.

Another independent variable is political socialization. Political socialization has been studied mostly in terms of parents-to-child transfer of political party identification (see for instance Tedin 1974, , Glass et al 1986, Niemi and Jennings 1991,Beck and Jennings 1975, 1991, Sears and Funk 1999, Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 1999,). Our survey asked: "How would you describe the overall political-party affiliation of the family you grew up in" and offered the options "mostly Democratic," "mostly Republican," "A mixture," and "non-political." In the statistical model, we include two indicators of parental influence. One indicates that the respondent reported parents being mostly Democratic, and the other mostly Republican. The reference category is respondents who record their parents being either a mixture of the two or non-political.

[17] We say D-and/or-Green, rather than D-or-Green, because 16 respondents checked *both* D and Green (and similarly, 3 checked R and Libertarian). Such double-checking respondents (some of which are non-academics) are included in Model 3.

We test to see whether non-academic scholars are less likely to vote Democratic than academic scholars. A positive correlation between voting D and being an academic would suggest sorting effects.

Respondents in anthropology and sociology had the highest D-to-R ratios, while respondents in economics had the lowest D-to-R ratio and the lowest academic frequency. To control for such extremities by discipline, we include as independent variables both anth-soc and economics.

In Model 1 we include a generational variable based on the year of the respondent's highest degree. According to legend, the universities and colleges were radicalized during the late 1960s and 1970s, and attracted individuals inclined to vote D, making a cohort or generational effect (Sears 1983). This effect would suggest that those who got their degree in the "radical era" would be more likely to be Ds than those before and after. We include two indicators, one that the respondent received her highest degree before 1968 (pre-68) and the other that she received it after 1980 (post-80). The reference category is respondents who received their degree between 1968 and 1980.

In Model 2 we omit the generational variable, and insert a different variable based on degree year. One theory holds that as a particular worldview comes to dominate a discipline, it reproduces itself. Hence the likelihood of voting D would increase over time. We test to see whether those with more recent degrees are more likely to vote D. The time trend variable is 2003 (the year of the survey) minus the year the respondent earned her highest degree.

In Model 3, we replicate the composition of Model 2, but do the regression on D-and/or-Green versus R-and/or-Libertarian.

Table 14. Odds ratios of voting D (with z-values in parentheses)

	Model 1 ***D v. R***	***Model 2*** ***D v. R***	***Model 3*** ***D/G v. R/L***
Parents Democrats	1.96**	1.99**	1.92**
	(2.70)	(2.77)	(2.66)
Parents Republican	0.61*	0.62*	0.63*
	(2.05)	(2.02)	(1.95)
Academic	2.24**	2.29**	2.27**
	(4.05)	(4.15)	(4.15)
Anth-Soc	3.34**	3.18**	3.34**
	(5.19)	(5.00)	(5.24)
Economics	1.47	1.33	1.33
	(1.45)	(1.05)	(1.09)
Policy index	0.11**	0.11**	0.10**
	(10.35)	(10.43)	(11.39)
Degree pre-1968	0.72		
	(1.46)		
Degree post-1980	1.25		
	(0.95)		
Trend (Yr of deg.)		1.03**	1.03**
		(2.96)	(2.93)
N	1365	1365	1414
Log likelihood	-399.36	-397.29	-406.80
Likelihood ratio χ^2	254.40***	258.54***	317.17***
Pseudo R^2	0.24	0.25	0.28

** 0.01 level, * 0.05 level, † 0.10 level

In the first model of Table 14, the results support the socialization hypothesis – individuals with Democratic parents are more likely, and those with Republican parents are less likely, to vote D compared to the neutral parent group. Also, again we see that scholars in academia are more likely to vote D than scholars outside academia.

Earlier we saw that, by far, anthropology and sociology had the highest D-to-R ratios and economics the lowest. With the other variables present, the economics effect does not hold up as significant, suggesting that one's policy score, not economic training

per se, correlates inversely with voting D.[18] However, anth-soc continues to be significant, suggesting that there is something especially left-wing about the anthropology and sociology professions.

Model 1 does not find a "radical era" effect. Respondents with pre-1968 degrees and post-1980 degrees do not differ significantly from the "radical era" respondents. Model 2, however, introduces the trend effect (year of degree), and it is significant. The longer ago the respondent got her degree, the less likely she is to vote D. One interpretation is self-reinforcing Democratic domination.

Model 3 separates by "left" and "right," and the results are unchanged.

In summary, voting D is significantly correlated with each of the following: having Democratic parents, being employed in academia, being an anthropologist or sociologist, having statist policy views, and having a more recent degree.

Exploring Ideological Groupings Using Cluster Analysis

Cluster analysis is a mathematical technique to identify groupings of observations (Everitt 1993, 10). There are many ways to perform cluster analysis and what we present here is the result of one particular cluster analysis that we found to be intuitive and interesting. However, the results presented here were typical of the many variations we investigated.[19]

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[18] We also ran Model 1 without the policy index. In that case, being an economist has a negative effect on voting D and is significant at the 0.01 level.

[19] We have created a large unpublished pdf-file appendix where we show results from alternative methods of performing the analysis. The appendix shows that all the methods generally results either very much like

Using STATA 8, we performed a clustering technique in which the N observations start out as N separate groups each of size one. The two closest groups are merged into one group and so on until all observations are merged into one large group. To define the closest two groups to be merged, we use complete linkage clustering, a technique that determines the farthest observations between two groups and merge groups accordingly.[20] The technique drops any observations with missing values. To reduce the loss of data, we excluded three policy issues: monetary and fiscal policy because many respondents indicated "have no opinion," and the "government production of schooling" question, because a substantial number of respondents did not answer the question.[21]

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or compatible with the results of the single analysis presented here. The appendix is available online at http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/survey/Alternative_cluster_analyses_appendix.doc.

[20] The cluster analysis uses the default L2 Euclidean distance.

[21] In the online appendix we have an alternative strategy were we treat "have no opinion" as "have mixed feelings" answers (hence coding them as 3 rather than missing) and keep fiscal and monetary policy items in the analyses. The results are similar.

Figure 8: Dendrogram of the complete linkage cluster analysis



The dendrogram (or cluster tree) shows how observations are grouped. Not shown in the dendrogram is the actual bottom of the tree, where each observation is its own group. The dendrogram picks up where the data have been grouped into 40 groups (labeled G1 through G40). The N labels show the size of each of the 40 groups (G1 contains 98 respondents). Above the "tops" of the 40 groups, the dissimilarity measure is represented on the vertical axis. Longer vertical lines indicate that the data contain more distinct clustering between groups, shorter lines indicate that groups are not as distinct. These dissimilarity measures form the basis of "stopping rules" to decide how many groups to identify.

At the very top of Figure 8, all the respondents are include in one universal group. Moving down to the first break, it is a small libertarian group that is strikingly different from the great mass. Continuing down, the great mass gets broken into two large groups. Continuing further, each large group gets divided. Identifying five groups is supported by recognized procedures.[22] The result of this purely mathematically technique is five groups that correspond quite well to familiar ideological categories.

We chose the descriptive names of the five groups after looking at the policy views. Four correspond to intuitive ideological categories: progressive, establishment left, conservative, and libertarian. One small group, which we call econ-polsci left, is leftist with views more like those of economists and political scientists.

[22] In Table 6, we show the result of two "stopping rule" criteria, Calinski and Harabasz *pseudo-F index* and the Duda and Hart *Je(2)/Je(1) index*. For both rules, larger index values indicate more distinct clustering. According to the Calinski and Harabasz stopping rule, our data contain two to five distinct groups (see Table 15).

Table 15: Determining the Number of Clusters in the Data

Number of clusters	Calinski/ Harabasz pseudo-F	Duda/Hart	
		Je(2)/Je(1)	Pseudo T^2
1		0.8771	139.86
2	**139.86**	0.8905	118.36
3	**137.44**	**0.9261**	**36.54**
4	**106.78**	0.9031	53.97
5	**97.28**	**0.9225**	**34.52**
6	86.78	0.8744	51.12
7	82.31	0.9454	27.03
8	76.21	0.8694	7.96

In deciding the number of groups based on the Duda and Hart stopping-rule, the rule of thumb is to find *Je(2)/Je(1) values* that correspond to low *pseudo* T^2 values that has much larger *pseudo* T^2 values next to it (Stata Cluster Analysis Reference Manual. 2003, 97). Thus, according to the Duda-Hart rule, it is reasonable to identify five distinct groups.

Table 16: The Five Ideological Groups of Academics and Voting within the Groups

Groups	Establ't Left	Progres-sive	Econ-PolSci Left	Conser-vative	Liber-tarian	Sum
Number in group	**470**	**413**	**47**	**35**	**35**	**1000**
Democratic voters	**384**	**380**	**26**	**8**	**4**[a]	**802**
% of Ds	47.9	47.4	3.2	1	0.5	100
% of the group	81.7	92.0	55.3	22.8	11.4	
Green voters	**3**	**11**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**15**
% of Gs	20.0	73.3	6.7	0	0	100
% of the group	0.6	2.7	2.1	0	0	
Libertarian voters	**0**	**2**	**1**	**0**	**12**	**15**
% of Ls	0	13.3	6.7	0	80	100
% of the group	0	0.5	2.1	0	34.3	
Republican voters	**42**	**1**	**13**	**23**	**14**	**93**
% of Rs	45.2	1.1	14.0	24.7	15.1	100
% of the group	8.9	0.2	27.7	65.7	40.0	
Miscellaneous voters	**41**	**19**	**6**	**4**	**5**	**75**
% of Misc voters	54.7	25.3	8.0	5.3	6.7	100
% of the group	8.7	4.6	12.8	11.4	14.3	
Total voters	**470**	**413**	**47**	**35**	**35**	**1000**
% of the group	100	100	100	100	100	

[a] Figure 5 showed no academic Democratic voter with a policy index above 3.5, so it may seem odd to find that four of the libertarians vote Democratic. One has a policy index of 4.22 but is in the ASPLP group, which is not included in Figure 5; the others have indices of 3.5, 3.5, and 3.39. They end up in the libertarian group because of the pattern of their responses over the 18 questions.

The establishment left and progressive groups are principally Democratic (81.7 percent and 92 percent, respectively). The econ-polsci left group is also mainly D voters, although it also has got its share of R voters. The conservative group is mainly composed of R voters. The libertarian group contains a smattering of voters, mainly R and L.

Table 17: The Five Ideological Group Averages on Economic Regulations

Groups	Establ't Left	Progres-sive	Econ-PolSci Left	Conser-vative	Liber-tarian
N	**470**	**413**	**47**	**35**	**35**
% Econ or Pol Sci	33.4	27.1	46.8	68.6	68.6
% Anth or Soc	38.5	50.8	31.9	17.1	8.6
Tariffs to protect industries and jobs	3.45	3.66	3.57	4.14	4.91
Minimum wage laws	1.29	1.25	2.32	3.69	4.66
Occupational safety regs (OSHA)	1.21	1.15	1.40	2.40	4.09
Pharmaceutical safety control (FDA)	1.18	1.34	1.51	2.46	4.26
Air and water regulation (EPA)	1.13	1.09	1.30	2.34	3.80

On economic regulations, the two huge groups, establishment left and progressives, are not much different. The conservatives are more skeptical about economic regulations, but compared to the libertarians are rather statist.

Table 18: The Five Ideological Group Averages on Personal Choice Regulations

Groups	Establ't Left	Progres-sive	Econ-PolSci Left	Conser-vative	Liber-tarian
Discrimination controls	1.31	1.15	1.49	2.54	3.54
Controls on "hard" drugs	1.59	2.97	3.91	1.46	4.06
Prostitution controls	2.38	3.77	4.34	2.11	4.46
Gambling restrictions	2.13	3.21	4.06	2.40	4.54
Gun control	1.40	1.29	2.89	2.86	4.51

In Table 18, the differences between the establishment left and the progressives are larger. Progressives are much more opposed to government control on drugs,

prostitution, and gambling, and they are slightly more supportive of control on guns and discrimination. The conservatives are highly statist on drugs, prostitution, and gambling.

Table 19: The Five Ideological Group Averages on Various Forms of Government Activism

Groups	Establ't Left	Progres-sive	Econ-PolSci Left	Conser-vative	Liber-tarian
Monetary policy	1.95	2.09	1.98	2.29	3.32
Fiscal policy	1.95	1.98	2.22	2.88	4.30
Redistribution	1.55	1.16	2.02	3.77	4.14
Government schooling	1.70	1.36	1.76	2.67	4.11
Government ownership of industrial enterprises	3.51	2.88	3.72	4.69	4.94
Tighter controls on Immigration	3.14	4.05	2.17	2.31	3.54
Military aid/presence abroad	3.08	3.92	2.55	2.03	3.09
Foreign aid (World Bank, IMF, USAID)	1.95	2.21	2.30	2.49	3.91
Policy index on all 18 issues	1.99	2.26	2.53	2.75	4.12

Table 19 shows that the progressives are the most supportive of redistribution and government schooling, and even lean toward government ownership of industrial enterprises. They are also the most opposed to tightening immigration controls and to military action abroad. On those four issues, the progressives and conservatives are at opposite ends. The conservatives tend to be supportive of tighter immigration controls and military action. The libertarians are mixed on military action.

As an overall indication, the bottom row presents the policy index scores for each group. The establishment left are the most statist, followed by the progressives, the econ-

polsci left, the conservatives, and the libertarians. It is clear that the libertarian group is the outlier, a fact that was highlighted at the top of the dendrogram by the libertarian group's being the last group to join the whole.

We constructed a simple measure of dyadic cluster dissimilarity. For the progressives and establishment left, for example, we look at the absolute value of the difference between their mean score on tariffs, and likewise for each of the other 17 issues, and add up the 18 differences. Table 20 reports these dissimilarity measures. It shows that the progressives and establishment left are very alike, with a dissimilarity of only 8.17. The dissimilarity between the conservatives and the progressives is 24.22. The dissimilarity between the conservatives and the establishment left is 18.19. But most notable is how dissimilar the libertarians are from any of the others. The minimum of dissimilarities between them and any other group is greater than the maximum of the dissimilarities between any pair of other groups. That is, libertarians and conservatives are less alike than progressives and conservatives!

Table 20: Dyadic dissimilarity between ideological groups

	Progres-sive	**Econ-PolSci Left**	**Conser-vative**	**Liber-tarian**
Establ't Left	8.17	12.61	18.19	38.28
Progres-sive		11.88	24.22	36.33
Econ-PolSci Left			17.80	28.67
Conser-vative				24.65

Summary

This article has presented a plethora of results from a large survey of six scholarly associations. The main results may be summarized as follows:

- Democrats dominate the social sciences. Anthropology and sociology are the most lopsided, with D-to-R ratios upwards of 20 to 1, and economics is the least lopsided, about 3 to 1. Among professors up through age 70, the overall Democrat-to-Republican ratio is probably about 8 to 1.
- The Democratic domination has increased significantly since 1970. Republicans are being eliminated.
- On most of the 18 policy issues, the Democrats are more statist than the Republicans. But on the whole Republicans were more statist on immigration, military action, drug prohibition, prostitution restrictions.
- Generally, the Democrats and Republicans fit the ideal-types. Perhaps the greatest departure from the ideal types is that neither group is very libertarian on the issues they are supposedly more libertarian on.
- The Democrats not only dominate, but they have a narrow tent. Whereas the Republicans usually have diversity on an issue, the Democrats very often have a party line. It is clear that there is significantly more diversity under the Republican tent.
- On the whole, the Democrats and Republicans are quite statist.
- Economists are measurably less statist, but most of them are still quite statist.

- Economists show the least consensus on policy issues. The differences between Democrats and Republicans are largest in economics, and the standard deviations are largest. A lack of consensus is a curious thing for the "queen of the social sciences."
- Younger professors tend to be slightly less statist than older professors.
- We find strong evidence that Republican scholars are more likely to be sorted out of academia.
- Voting D is significantly correlated with having Democratic parents, being employed in academia, being an anthropologist or sociologist, having statist policy views, and having a more recent degree.
- The cluster analysis sorted the respondents into five groups, four of which correspond to familiar and distinct ideological categories: establishment left, progressive, conservative, and libertarian.
- On three issues (drugs, prostitution, and military), the conservatives are the most statist of the five groups. On five issues—drugs, prostitution, gambling, immigration, military action—the distance between the average conservative score and the average libertarian score was greater than that between progressive and libertarian.
- Simple measures show that the libertarians are quite exceptional. The minimum of the dissimilarities between them and any other group is greater than the maximum of dissimilarity between any pair of other groups.

The "liberal versus conservative" formulation of American politics omits the libertarians from the landscape, yet the libertarian and conservative groups appear to be equal in size in the social disciplines (each cluster-group consisted of 35 individuals). If freedom is a core political value, then there is something very wrong with a formulation that omits the ideology most aligned with that value.

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